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 Cable Franchise Fees and PEG Fees function as key resources to the longevity of 
local media. Critics of the fees suggest that revenue earned from them is misplaced, 
and/or misused. This research examines the budgets of twenty US cities to determine how 
much money cities are collecting from these fees and where these funds are spent in an 
attempt to determine if the actual usages of Franchise and PEG Fee revenue corresponds 
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GLOSSARY  
Cable Act: The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 amended The 
Communications Act of 1934 by adding a title named “Cable Communications” which 
outlined the process for franchise agreements between cable companies and 
municipalities. This included the federal authorization of a municipality’s right to collect 
a PEG Fee and Franchise Fee.  
 
Federal Communications Commission: The federal body in the United States that 
operates independently to create and oversee laws regarding the operation and 
consumption of mass media.  
 
Franchise agreement: A contract that allows the franchisor (municipality) to specify the 
conditions by which the franchisee (cable company) may do business. These are regularly 
used to grant an investor permission to use the business model or intellectual property of 
a pre-existing company. For the purposes of this resarch a franchise agreement refers to 
the legally binding conditions the cable company agreed to in exchange for the rights to 
use the public right of way. These conditions may include the collection of fees.  
 
Franchise Fees: Plainly, a fee an investor pays to operate a franchise. For this research a 
Franchise Fee refers to the optional fee a municipility charges to a cable company for use 
of the public right of way. The fee may be set at up to 5% of the gross revenue earned by 
the cable company. In actuality citizens pay this fee instead of the cable company 
because the FCC approved cable companies’ right to pass the fee along to the consumer 
as long as the fee is line-itemed on the customer’s bill. Revenue from the Franchise Fee 
may be spent however the municipality chooses.  
 
Local Franchising Authority: (LFA) Are the local agencies that oversee FCC regulations 
within a given locale. They are responsible for the collection of PEG and Franchise Fees 
in addition to enforcing other rules and regulations on cable television.  
 
Public right of way: A right to equtiable and public use of a piece of land for a 
desiginated purpose. For example, sidewalks are public, equal use, and for walking. 
Roads are public and for operating vehicles. Cable companies must use the public 
roadways for private enterprise in order to lay cable in a city. The FCC requires that the 
public be compensated for the cable companies use of public land by payment to the city 
(franchise agreement).   
 
PEG Fee:  An optional fee a municipality may levy as part of a franchise agreement. 
There is no cap on this fee, but revenue must be used for the capital costs incured by 
Public, Education, and Government (PEG) media infrastructure. In actuality citizens pay 
this fee instead of the cable company because the FCC approved cable companies’ right 
to pass the fee along to the consumer as long as the fee is line-itemed on the customer’s 
bill. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Every month cable-subscribing-citizens in the United States pay fees that are 
levied by cities on cable companies, and in turn passed onto them by those companies. It 
is likely that subscribers who have never reviewed the line-items of their cable bill are 
unaware of these charges. In Austin these fees totaled an estimated $731 per cable 
subscribing household across twelve months in 2016. These charges are composed of two 
things: Franchise Fees and PEG Fees.  
In theory, revenue earned from each fee functions as repayment to the public for 
the costs incurred by private cable enterprises on public land but, in practice, the fees are 
an additional monthly charge to cable viewers. To mandate this theoreitical repayment, 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) developed the 1984 Cable Franchise 
Policy and Communications Act which outlines the details of the two fees. The Franchise 
Fee, an up to 5% tax on the gross revenue earned by a cable company that the city may 
spend however it wishes, and the PEG Fee, which can be levied at any percentage, and 
must be used for providing media resources to local public, educational, and government 
institutions. Combined, the fees’ revenue ensures that municipalities can endure the costs 
of cable operations, and provide resources for the creation and broadcast of local media 
by the public against the backdrop of corporate cable. However, pursuant to (47 U.S. 
Code § 542) the cable company may line item PEG Fees and Franchise Fees on the 
customer’s bill, passing the cost onto the consumer, and creating a disconnect between 
the theory of what the fees ought to do and the practice of what they actually do. 
                                                          
1 See page (27) 
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Despite charging the public an additional tax instead of reimbursing them, the 
fees may still contribute to the public good. The cumulative revenue generated by PEG 
and Franchise Fees for cities is substantial. For example, in 2011 San Francisco collected 
upwards of $10 million in Franchise Fees alone (Waldman, 2011).  These funds, along 
with those generated from the PEG Fee, have historically been used to bolster local 
media through the funding of public access channels, schools, and libraries. This funding 
strengthens the local information systems that are required components of democratic 
societies by financing institutions responsible for the distribution of local media. 
Information on local governmental action and current events is essential to political 
agency because knowledge of such affairs facilitates informed voting, community 
advocacy, institutional decision making, and civic engagement (Shaker, 2009; Starr, 
2011). 
Notwithstanding the magnitude and historical use of the fees, it is unclear how the 
revenue from them is being used today. A recent law suit asserted that Portland, Oregon 
had misallocated $14 million of Franchise and PEG Fee revenue, though the suit never 
saw trial (Rogoway, 2016; Rogoway, 2017). Others have reported logistical concerns, 
noting that when money is collected only a portion of it reaches the public (Waldman, 
2011).  
Thus, to determine whether or not major cities are collecting these fees, and the 
manner in which they are spent, this research audits the most recently published annual 
budget of each of the twenty largest cities in the US. In documenting the costs and 
allocations of the two fees this research begins a larger conversation about the purpose 
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and function of the fees, their role in the digital era, and whether or not they are living up 
to their potential of bringing important local media resources and content to the public. 
After all, the fees ought to benefit the public because everyday citizens, not the cable 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 Foundational theories of democracy informed the decision making processes that 
would later shape the Cable Act and the particular fees concerning this research. These 
theories demonstrate the importance of localism in democratic politics. For example, Mill 
(1865) argued that organizations for “local affairs are...fundamental institutions of a free 
government” (p.319). From this perspective, localism distributes governing power more 
closely to the private citizen by providing a greater opportunity to participate in, and be 
elected to make decisions about matters that directly affect their lives. Locating political 
power closer to the individual and their proximal influence has long been the motivation 
for sustaining local politics in the US even if at the cost of federal power (Briffault, 1990; 
Napoli, 2001). Critical to the health of local politics is local media. Theoretical and 
empirical works demonstrate that the newspaper, televised news, and public radio 
broadcast have long been the impetus for defining the boundaries of, and encouraging 
participation in local politics (Napoli, 2001; Baker, 2007; Shaker, 2014).  
Localism from Theory to Policy 
In the context of communication policy, localism is broadly utilized as a catch-all 
term to suggest that communication infrastructure should be crafted around the needs of 
local communities to enrich a sense of local identity and strengthen participation in 
democratic institutions. Local media is the evident linchpin of such matters as they 
provide the shared information basis used to create a sense of local politics amongst 
citizens. Tarde (1903) writes that early newspapers defined the boundaries of community 
as they set common topics of discussion among residents in a given area. Collectively 
understood topics for public dialogue cultivate and solidify a public identity as they 
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reveal events that have mutual effects on both private and neighborly affairs. Further, in 
the most fundamental way, local media are critical to establishing community-based 
political associations as they construct the identity around which local interlocutors 
organize.  
The value of local politics is among the starting points from which the FCC crafts 
its policies. Napoli (2001) refers to these starting points as the founding principles of the 
FCC which include adherence to the First Amendment, the public interest, the 
marketplace of ideas, diversity, competition, universal service, and of chief importance to 
this research: localism. At the institutional center of the FCC’s policy making process 
these principles function as guiding rules, the justification for revising antiquated laws, 
and the filter for implementing new ones. 
True to its principle of localism, the FCC has a legacy of safeguarding the 
production of local political information by ensuring local media remain permanent 
fixtures across the national media landscape. For example, the Radio Act of 1927 
reserved bands of frequency and time slots for the broadcast of community radio. Carter 
Mountain Transmission Corporation v. Federal Communications Commission and many 
similar cases crystallized the FCC’s commitment to localism. Here, and in the federal 
litigation that followed, the FCC strengthened their regulatory power by extending their 
jurisdiction to the regulation of cable television. Napoli (2001) writes that the FCC had 
determined that localism was a sufficiently important federal objective to curb the First 
Amendment rights of cable companies in favor of a mandate that cable carriers reserve 
space and resources for public access television. In 1967, Congress created public 
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television under the rationale that broadcasting should serve both a mass audience and the 
diverse cultural interests within those masses (Napoli, 2001). Since then, the FCC has 
engineered policy infrastructure to maintain and nurture what has been called “the 
public’s soapbox, or the electronic equivalent of the printed leaflet”-public access 
television (Linder, 1999, p.xxvi). Materially, this infrastructure is subsidized by the 
resources locales derive from PEG and Franchise Fees. 
Baker (2007) provides theoretical justifications for the regulatory protection of 
local media. He argues that the “one-person/one-unit-of-political-power” applies not only 
to voting, but to participation in the public sphere as well (p.7). Indeed those with the 
means to broadcast political positions to mass audiences have disproportionate access to 
the public sphere, and by extension more units of political power compared to the 
average person. Often, their broadcasts may push local matters to the periphery in favor 
of a more profit-seeking or national focus. Regulation seeks to correct for this by 
providing platforms for the common person to spread their ideas and engage in local 
political dialogue. Baker (2007) further explains that media is the mediator between the 
will of the people and governments. Mass media simultaneously serves the role of a 
fourth-estate check on governmental action, while also providing reporting which serves 
to enunciate, at least a perception of public opinion to governments. Absent regulation, 
Baker fears that media ownership concentration threatens this relationship by reducing 
the number of outlets, especially at the local level, that can function as a necessary check 
on governments, corporate corruption, and misinformation. 
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In the spirit of regulating on the behalf of local media to protect them from the 
forces of unobstructed market control, the FCC provisioned the Cable Act with tools that 
locales may utilize to strengthen public television. After approximately a decade of legal 
battles following the invention of cable television in Pennsylvania, United States v. 
Southwestern Cable determined that the FCC held the authority to regulate cable 
television (CATV) because it was in the scope of the institution’s organic legal authority, 
and in the public interest. The Supreme Court ruling provided the constitutional backing 
by which the FCC mandates channel carriage requirements for cable companies to this 
day. Among the first of these was the requirement for all companies with over 3,500 
subscribers to provide and carry all local television channels broadcast within a locality, 
beginning the federal subsidization and protection of local television. Within this 
regulatory framework, a local authority was needed to ensure that carriers were meeting 
their obligations, so Local Franchising Authorities (LFAs) were established. An LFA 
broadly refers to the local body that works with the FCC to enforce communication law, 
and they can be a municipality, a county, and occasionally a state. 
 The Cable Act, and its revisions, allow LFAs to charge cable networks operating 
within their field of influence two fees (though these are ultimately passed on to 
subscribers by cable companies). The first is a Franchise Fee, which an LFA may charge 
in exchange for allowing the cable provider to use the public right of way for equipment 
(e.g. cable lines buried beneath local roads). Franchise Fees can be charged up to an 
amount of 5% of the cable company’s gross revenue on cable, and are routed back to the 
city in which a cable provider operates. The FCC does not mandate the funds are spent in 
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any particular way, and it may not be legally defined as a PEG Fee within franchising 
agreements reached after 1984 (47 U.S. Code § 542). Separate from the Franchise Fee 
then, the Cable Act provides the ability for LFAs to also levy PEG Fees, which must be 
spent in particular directions. The percentage of the PEG Fee is set by the LFA, and the 
proceeds must be used for public access broadcasting, educational media and 
broadcasting, and/or government access television. Limiting the allowed uses of capital 
earned from the fee even further, the FCC holds that PEG Fees may only be used for the 
capital costs incurred for PEG access facilities (Bolema, 2008). Recently, the 6th Circuit 
Court affirmed that PEG fees must be spent on capital costs (Alliance for Community 
Media v. FCC, 2008). This ruling also made clear that the operational definition of 
capital costs according to Congress “may include vans, studios, cameras, or other 
equipment relating to the use of public, educational, or governmental channel capacity.” 
(Sixth Circuit Court, 2008, p.18). Thus, capital costs are not only limited to the operation 
of a facility, but the total costs incurred to outfit a PEG facility or program. Though the 
legal debate continues, outside of staff costs, PEG facilities may largely spend funds how 
they see fit to run their programs.    
Empirical Importance of Local Media  
In addition to the theoretical significance between media and localism, modern 
works continue to expound on the relationship between local media and various political 
correlates through empirical observation. Such observations continue to highlight the 
importance of fortifying local media via communication policy. Shaker (2014) evidences 
the adverse consequences the loss of a local news source can have on civic engagement. 
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Even in a large metropolitan area like Denver, Colorado civic engagement declined by a 
measure of 30% when a local newspaper closed (Shaker, 2014). As the number of outlets 
for local information declines so does participation in that political sphere (Kaniss, 1997; 
Friedland & McLeod, 1999). The closure of a city newspaper or television station means 
that a major, perhaps at times the only, vehicle for communicating important events and 
governmental concerns about the community is lost. Empirical findings from various 
works (Mondak 1995; Schulhofer-Wohl & Garrido, 2011; Shaker, 2014) confirm that 
compared to those with access to local media, those without, or who have recently lost 
access to their source, showed lower rates of local political knowledge and community 
attachment. Hence, the disappearance of local media causes local political participation to 
wane by extinguishing the resources necessary to participate in governance. Similarly, 
Moy, McCluskey, McCoy, and Spratt (2004) demonstrate that attention to local news 
increases political knowledge and political participation among locals. Access then, tends 
to create more informed political decision making at the local level by encouraging a 
proliferation of political knowledge that might otherwise not occur. Situating the power 
of self-rule in spatially and socially close publics magnifies the political agency of their 
occupants. In sum, local media is a pillar of democratic politics. If the quality and 
accessibility of local political information deteriorates, so too might the strength of local 
democracies.  
The Modern Media Landscape and Stakeholders in PEG and Franchise Fees  
Regulating the market on the behalf of local media has become of heightened 
importance. The last comprehensive evaluation of US media by The Pew Research 
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Center revealed daily local newspaper revenue declining by 8%, the worst economic year 
for the local paper since the Great Recession (Barthell, 2016).  Further, local television 
channels are steadily losing revenue. In 2015, they lost 7% in advertising revenue 
(Barthell, 2016). Revenue continues to rise for cable companies, but subscriptions are 
declining overall (Barthell, 2016; Waldman, 2011). With newspapers struggling to 
survive, local television cutting costs, and many foregoing the subscriptions that give 
them access to coverage on local matters, sources of local political information are 
dwindling. The need for regulatory intervention becomes more pressing as these trends 
continue. However, it remains yet to be determined if PEG and Franchise Fees are the 
appropriate policies.  
Stakeholders across diffuse socio-political spheres hold diverging perspectives on 
the role the two fees play in preserving local media and politics in the digital age. For the 
cable subscribing local the PEG Fee and Franchise fee is not only meant to subsidize 
local media, it is also intended to function as repayment for a carrier’s operation in a city 
as they have to fracture roadways to lay cable. The costs of this are absorbed by the 
public via taxes that pay for road construction and through wear on personal vehicles. At 
the same time cable companies are afforded protection in the marketplace in the area 
because it does not make logistic or contractual sense to lay cable twice. Hence, a city 
will regularly only make franchise deals with a single cable company. Plainly then, the 
public contributes to the earnings of carriers. From the public’s postion this necessitates 
both a tax on cable companies and the need for non-private public programming. A tax 
because the city is owed repayment to repair and re-invest in the publically shared 
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roadways, and a reservation of space and resources for non-private programming on air 
so a single company cannot have unilateral control over public consumption of television 
media. However, the tax on cable companies is instead passed on to the public, which 
creates a flaw in this logic of repayment. The totality of PEG and Franchise Fee revenue 
is funded solely by the millions of homes throughout the United States with a cable 
subscription. Yet it remains uncertain if this value is returned to those households in a 
meaninfgul way. More precisely, it is not certain that the households in Austin that pay 
$73 in Franchise Fees a year are returned that value in public projects.  
From the cable companies’ point-of-view PEG and Franchise Fees may be 
antiquated products of a past media landscape which make it more difficult to compete 
against digital television. As a result of passing both fees off to the consumer, cable bills 
are higher than digital-only services that depend on broadband delivery which is not 
subject to PEG or Franchise Fees. This does little to make cable television a more 
compelling option than subscriotion based interenet TV. The rise of internet based TV 
has resulted in cable subscriptions declining. In 2015, one in seven Americans had 
cancelled their cable subscriptions after previously being a customer (Horriggan & 
Duggan, 2015). In 2016, this number reached one in five (Pressman, 2016).  
From a governmental perspective PEG and Franchise funds are a major source of 
capital that municipalities may use for special projects like infrastructure repair, and/or 
renovations like the building of a new library. PEG funds in particular have been used by 
municipal public safety offices. For example, in Illinois PEG funds “provided disaster 
coverage and assistance when an 80-to-90-mile-per-hour wind tore through town in 
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2007” (Waldman, 2011, p.171). In many cases, PEG financed channels spread severe 
weather warnings, disseminate information about disaster aid and relief, and report on 
missing persons after disasters. Despite the governmental advantages, the fees may 
provide there exists no check on how cities utilize the fees outside of what they self-
report in their budgets. In evaluating whether or not the fees are still a relevant 
contributor to the public good there must be a budgetary review to determine if the funds 
average households contribute to these programs are re-invested in their direction, or 
disbursed elsewhere.  
Past, Present, and Future of PEG and Franchise Fees  
Ideally, revenue from PEG Fees is used for the public good. For example, PEG 
programs often reflect diverse characteristics of the people in a locale that might 
otherwise not be captured in the spectrum of cable broadcasts. “In Minnesota, the Saint 
Paul Neighborhood Network (SPNN) offered eight programs for the growing Somali 
population in the area” (Waldman, 2011, p.171). Additionally, throughout the United 
States public access channels provided programming in “Greek, Czech, Hungarian, 
Albanian, German, French, Portuguese, Vietnamese, Chinese, Korean, Hmong, Farsi, 
Arabic, Hebrew, and Swahili” (Waldman, 2011, p.171). PEG funding provides the means 
for diverse populations to gain access to information that is vital to cultural enrichment, 
political self-determination, and the actualization of community.  
Absent public access media funded by PEG, specific groups of non-English 
speaking people in a locale may not have access to news media. For example, it is 
unlikely for there to be a textual publication of local news in Swahili. PEG funds increase 
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the potential for a diverse set of political interests to be heard in the public sphere by 
providing access to that sphere. Without PEG funds certain, often marginalized, 
community members may go without access to local information, relegating the domain 
of local politics to an already in-group. This dynamic stifles the democratic process at the 
local level because it creates and excludes outgroups from the decision making processes 
that affect their daily lives. Information bases and a willingness to involve oneself in 
local politics have profound practical effects on local democracies because locals who 
regularly consume local media are more likely to vote, attend neighborhood meetings, 
and mobilize themselves to positively shape their publics.  
PEG programs have also provided media resources to local public schools. PEG 
funds are the reason that millennials may remember programing like The Reading 
Rainbow and Bill Nye the Science Guy as core parts of their curriculum. Which is to say 
PEG revenue has often been used to acquire the neighborhood elementary school’s 
televisions and computers. In fact, PEG funding is crucial to providing public schools 
with a variety of media equipment for diverse purposes. For example, public access 
channels are the ones that will cover the local high school basketball game encouraging a 
shared sense of local identity. PEG funds have also been used to provide broadband 
access to community library centers and high schools, supplying students and community 
members with the countless benefits of the internet when they otherwise might not have 
access.   
PEG monies have also be used to fund the creation of public programming for and 
by locals. Kalamazoo, Michigan’s Public Media Network offers vocational courses in 
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video production. Waldman (2011) notes that the average size PEG center can furnish the 
necessary training and equipment for up to 200 community video specialists annually. 
Community access programming may be the domain of tin-foil-hat-wearing late night 
talk specials, and the premise of the cult classic comedy Wayne’s World, but it is also an 
opportunity for anybody with an idea to broadcast it to their community. Giving the 
public an ability to create and broadcast televised content redistributes access to the 
public sphere. This provides potential political platforms for those who may not own a 
studio or their own newspaper. In this way PEG law at time provides for the so-called 
electronic leaflet, perhaps strengthening the mediation between people and their 
governments at the local level, and advancing the check on institutional corruption Baker 
(2007) called for.    
Finally, PEG Fees may benefit governmental transparency at the local level. 
Government channels provide floor coverage of city council meetings and similar events 
that would otherwise be inaccessible to the public. Waldman (2011) reports that CCTV, 
the public channel in Salem, Oregon, has televised 2,200 government meetings which 
would have gone without coverage from larger media. Broadcasting political information 
creates an archive of what was said about the decisions that will affect citizens’ day to 
day lives. It also means journalists have a record to hold local politicians accountable to 
in later interviews. Thus PEG media is vital to local civic agency, especially in smaller 
rural and suburban media markets that may have coverage of the events occurring in 
more populated surrounding cities via commercial media that may not cover public 
policy of outer-lying areas.  
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Present day implementation of PEG and Franchise Fees at the business and 
government levels might mitigate their possible advantages. First, state law often 
supersedes federal PEG guidelines. Cable operators were allowed to reduce PEG support 
by nearly $600,000 in San Francisco County because the state adjusted the total amount 
of fees an LFA can collect by instituting a more limiting cap on the fee. (City and County 
of San Francisco Comments, 2009). Additionally, a legal claim filed in the Multnomah 
County Circuit Court during November of 2016 claims that the city of Portland and four 
of its surrounding communities misallocated more than fourteen-million dollars earned 
from PEG Fee revenue collected from cable companies that year (Rogoway, 2016). The 
plaintiff in this action suggested that there is a risk funds went to paying salaries of public 
officials, and/or to projects completely unrelated to public media access rather than their 
designated purpose. The case was later dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff failed 
to show damage or injury from the misallocation (Rogoway, 2017). Local courts and 
governments overruling FCC guidelines calls into question the use-value of the Cable Act 
in strengthening localism. Beneficiaries from these rulings may argue it is indeed an 
exercise of localism to self-govern at the cost of federal rules.  
In addition to local laws side-stepping FCC regulation, cable companies are doing 
the same. Current lack of federal control over the operations of private enterprise creates 
room for cable providers to place public channels on the margins of their services in 
certain areas. Waldman (2011) notes that AT&T has placed all PEG programming on a 
single channel that requires the viewer to make their way through multiple drop down 
menus to select the channel of their choosing. Rather than a designated public channel, 
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that same content resides in the depths of several digital windows the viewer must 
navigate. Not only does this require a digital literacy some may not possess, but many 
community members still lack the equipment such as a cable box to view digital 
channels. At the same time cable companies are within the bounds of communication law 
and may place channels where they wish so long as they are still providing local content. 
From the business point of view companies should have the freedom to arrange their 
channels in a way that fulfills their fiduciary obligations to investors.  
Cable Franchise Fees have also historically yielded public and government 
benefits. In New York City, Franchise Fees were totaled at 140 million dollars during 
2010. Franchise Fees have also been used to direct even more capital into PEG facilities 
(Waldman, 2011). Suggesting that if used to its maximum benefit Franchise Fees could 
fund PEG facilities to their full capacities virtually indefinitely. Local governments may 
use the funds however they see necessary which provides budgetary room for special 
projects not covered by federal or state support. Given the absence of limits on how 
Franchise Fees may be disbursed, a city can use this for its own development, like 
improving bridges. Or perhaps for an emergency fund. In the broadest sense Franchise 
Fees are important because they can, and have, financed the special and unique interests 
of the local, centralizing political power closer to home, and satisfying Mill’s (1865) 
requirement for democracies to widely scatter governing power to the proximal, overall 
augmenting the propensity for self-determination.  
The major criticism of the Franchise Fee rests in its present day lack of 
accountability, because it is illegal to regulate how Cable Franchise Fee revenue is spent, 
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the money often disappears into the general treasury with no evidence of where it was 
dispersed to after the initial transfer to the general fund. This complaint may be 
magnified by the realization all cable Franchise Fees are paid for by the consumer. 
Ideally, those funds should be reinvested for the public good as it is an effective tax on 
the public. Franchise Fee revenue has the potential to greatly improve cities, but it is 
often uncertain whether or not that improvement is being actualized because 
disbursements from such revenue are only reported as disbursements from the general 
fund. In some cases where it could be determined the degree to which Franchise Fee 
revenue is allocated toward public spending the amount is relatively small. Waldman 
(2011), cites an email from Jennifer Gilomen, the Director Public Media Strategies at 
Bay Area Video Coalition during 2011, describing that “in San Francisco, only about 8 
percent, of the roughly $10 million to $12 million cable operators pay in franchise fees, 
goes to public access each year” (p.173). Thus, analysts are irresolute that the money the 
public is being charged is returned to them.  
Looking forward, the fate of both fees is in doubt as cord-cutting grows more 
common. Subscription services such as Netflix and Hulu are increasingly making cable 
subscriptions irrelevant. As a result the changing media landscape is constricting a major 
source of funding for local media by limiting Franchise and PEG Fee revenue because 
both fees are entirely composed of money paid by the cable subscriber. The 
contemporary composition of the media marketplace encourages a re-evaluation of the 
relevance of these fees, and if they prove to remain useful, begs for a discussion on how 
to best modernize their operation.  
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Additionally, as broadband becomes more widely available critics of PEG and 
Franchise Fees might propose that the internet alone provides the same advantages: a 
forum for individual expression, diversity of content, and access to noncommercial 
opinions in place of public access programs. The need for the fees may be decreased by 
major information sharing web platforms like YouTube and Facebook. However, just as 
wealth and ownership concentration affects what might be broadcast on television, it also 
determines who has access to the internet and digital content writ large. Though the 
internet may provide similar benefits to public television and PEG facilities, access to 
broadband is still disproportionate among many populations in the US (FCC, 2015). 
Further, PEG funds have been utilized to subsidize internet access among students and 
rural populations (Waldman, 2011). Therefore, even if the evolution of the media 
landscape outpaces traditional platforms like public television there still may be use and 
need for PEG and Franchise finances.  
Research Questions    
 Supporters of PEG and Franchise Fees conclude that they provide 
multidimensional benefits, but a dearth of financial evidence exists to determine whether 
or not they really live up to these aspirations. Little evidence documents that fees are 
being spent meaningfully, and in a manner consistent with FCC law. Though, the search 
for this evidence should prioritize a secondary, more specific question that asks what 
benefits the members of a public see returned to them when they pay these fees each 
month. Further, the potential versus actualized benefits of each fee should be grounded in 
the context of the changing media environment. If cities are not allocating revenue earned 
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from PEG and Franchise Fees to public media, or are only doing so to a minimal degree, 
then there may not be unique advantages to them when compared to the benefits and rise 
of internet platforms. As we transition to the digital era this research seeks to contribute 
to a larger discussion on the modern day purpose and function of the PEG and Franchise 
Fee by gathering the foundational data to answer the aforementioned questions. 
Identifying the contemporary function of the fees is a pre-requisite to determining 
whether or not the FCC principle of localism is being met, and if the form that localism 
takes is mobilized for the public good.  
RQ1: If Franchise Fees are being collected, how much did a city earn from them? 
RQ2: Where is Franchise Fee revenue being spent? 
Franchise Fees collect billions of dollars from millions of households, but there is 
alarmingly little clarity about how those funds are spent. Tracking the collection and 
disbursement of revenue is an essential component of good governance because it holds 
leaders accountable for the policies that they are obligated to enforce. In other words, 
prior to making a demand that a public policy should be strengthened it is necessary to 
prove that it is not currently being enacted properly. The prerequisite to proper 
enforcement of policy is sound data, which motivates my following research questions. 
RQ3: If PEG funds are being collected, how much did a city earn from them?  
RQ4: Are PEG funds spent in a way consistent with FCC mandates?  
Put simply, this will be the first data collection of its kind and it comes at a crucial point 
in the fight for local media. Local newspapers are declining at unprecedented rates 
(Shaker, 2014). Local media outlets are vanishing and along with them their unique 
INVESTIGATING CABLE                                       20 
 
social and political benefits. PEG and Franchise Fees collect large amounts of funds each 
year with the purpose of supporting local media. If funds are being misallocated to the 
extent that critics suggest, then cities are squandering the fruits of a key policy that may 
guarantee some semblance of local media subsisting in the future, and in turn may be 
wasting the public’s money as they are the people supplying the revenue.   
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
 The audit to follow combines budgetary reports from the twenty largest U.S. cities 
by population as of 2013. These cities were selected because more populated cities are 
where franchise agreements affect the largest number of people. The analyzed budgets 
are from the most recent complete fiscal year (FY 2015-2016) excluding the budgets 
from Charlotte, North Carolina and Indianapolis, Indiana for which proposed budgets for 
the operating fiscal year (FY 2016-2017) were used because the most recently completed 
fiscal years of the two cities were not available. Budgets were collected from official 
government websites from each respective city. Each budget was inspected to determine 
whether or not the city collected PEG and Franchises Fees and, if so, the total reported 
(FY 15-16) or projected (FY 16-17) revenue from those fees and financial disbursements 
to cable and PEG recipients were identified and reported. This information was located 
by using the following search terms within each document. In order of use: “cable”, 
“PEG”, “franchise”, “telecommunication”, “tv”, and “television.” If the search terms did 
not locate relevant information, budgets were read page by page to discover the pertinent 
information.  
 If the budget for a given city did not report collecting either fee, the LexisNexis 
database was employed to find evidence which confirmed whether or not the city 
collected the fees. This secondary search was used for data anchoring purposes. Even if 
LexisNexis documents did not include budgetary totals, they documented whether or not 
those totals were supposed to be included in the budgetary report and were thus missing 
or if they were absent because the city elected not to collect the fees. LexisNexis search 
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terms included the city in question and PEG or Franchise Fee, e.g. “Austin AND PEG” or 
“Dallas AND Franchise.” LexisNexis includes case law, news articles, and state and 
federal cases. In addition, the largest locally funded public television station in the city 
was identified. This search excluded channels that exist under the umbrella of The Public 
Broadcasting Service. If more data was needed to confirm that a city did or did not 
collect either fee, financial records of public stations were reviewed in an attempt to 
determine if they received funding from either PEG or Franchise Fees disbursements. 
Last, each city budget was read page-by-page to determine where revenue from both fees 
was expended, if at all. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Table 1   
Collection of Fees     
 
Table 1 documents whether or not the city in question collects a PEG Fee and a 
Franchise Fee. Twelve of the twenty cities shown in Table 1 report collecting a PEG Fee 
via their own budgetary reports, or documented evidence found through LexisNexis. 
Eight cities were confirmed not to collect PEG Fees.  
All cities were determined to collect a Franchise Fee. Because each fee is 
dependent on the franchising agreement the cable company holds with each franchising 
City PEG fee Collection?  Franchise Fee 
Collection? 
Major public channel  
Austin  Yes Yes ATXN 
Charlotte No Yes Access 21 
Chicago  No  Yes CAN TV 
Columbus  No Yes CTV 
Dallas  No Yes None as of 2009 
Detroit  Yes Yes Unknown  
El Paso   Yes  Yes KCOS TV  
Fort Worth  Yes Yes FWTV 
Houston  Yes  Yes HTV 
Indianapolis  Yes Yes Ch. 16 
Jacksonville  No Yes Ch. 99 
Los Angeles  Yes  Yes LA 36 
New York  Yes  Yes DCTV 
Philadelphia  Yes Yes PHL GOV TV 
Phoenix No Yes PHX TV 
San Antonio  No Yes PATV 
San Diego  Yes Yes CTN 
San Francisco  No  Yes SF Commons  
San Jose  Yes  Yes Cera TV 
Seattle  Yes Yes Channel 77/23  
Charlotte reports a unique “Carrier Fee” but no PEG Fee, and Access 21 reports the funding as Public 
Access Fees.  
Jacksonville’s public channel halted public programming in 2015 per a renewed agreement with 
Comcast, and now only provides government programming.  
Detroit, Jacksonville, Phoenix, San Antonio, and San Francisco do not report collecting a PEG Fee, 
but fund the public access channel listed.  
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authority in a given city, the absence of either fee in a budget is likely the result of the 
city’s choice not to levy either fee on cable carriers (Cable Act §611(b) [531(b)]). 
However, cities which are confirmed to collect either fee in Table 1 should have revenue 
and expenditures to report from those fees in their budgets. Table 2 will reveal sums of 
these expenditures, and Table 3 will categorize those sums.  
Each city which collects a PEG Fee also has a public access channel. The funded 
stations are primarily a mix between government programming and broadcasts of content 
created by the public, and are unique to each city. Data shows that the PEG Fee is not the 
only resource cities are using to finance the operations of the public stations. In each city 
researched a cable subscription holder will have access to a public station. Cities are 
using their right to mandate that carriers reserve space for the broadcast of public 
programming. 
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Table 2 
Cable Related City Finances 
City Franchise Fee 
Revenue  




after PEG & 
Cable 
Expenditures   
Austin  $37,700,000 $1,900,000 $5,474,177 $34,125,823 
Charlotte* $7,959,632 No Fee $3,449,234 $4,510,398 
Chicago  $29,200,000 No Fee $656,297 $28,543,730 
Columbus  $9,600,000 No Fee $1,055,233 $8,544,767 
Dallas  $27,394,587 No Fee $2,567,235 $24,827,352 
Detroit*  $7,800,000 $500,000  $1,989,998 $6,310,002 
El Paso*   $8,767,956 Not reported $964,887 $7,803,069 
Fort Worth  $6,680,684 $1,200,000 $1,200,000 $6,680,684 
Houston  $23,900,000 $5,286,382 $4,917,557 $23,672,343 
Indianapolis  Not reported $556,193 $556,193 0 
Jacksonville*  $35,300,000 No Fee Not reported NA 
Los Angeles*  $20,403,181  $7,769,718 $34,959,299 $5,223,002 
New York*  $160,847,000 Not reported $36,241,332 $124,605,668 
Philadelphia  $21,442,000  Not reported Not reported  NA 
Phoenix* $9,500,000 No Fee $6,430,349 $3,069,651 
San Antonio  $30,700,000 No Fee $212,410 $30,487,590 
San Diego  $18,600,000 Not reported $5,263,052 $13,336,948 
San Francisco*  $3,090,700 No Fee Not reported NA 
San Jose  $9,900,000 $2,000,000 $2,243,396 $9,656,604 
Seattle  $8,645,104 Not reported $8,417,829 $227,275 
Charlotte Reports an additional revenue of $100,000 as a “carrier fee” (Appendix B). 
Detroit reports $2.8 million of Franchise Revenue coming from “Maintenance Fees” (Appendix F). 
El Paso reported their PEG revenue as an aggregate with Franchise Fees and thus it is indiscernible 
(Appendix G). 
Jacksonville’s Franchise Revenue is an aggregate score of all Franchise Fees the city collects in 
addition to cable (Appendix K).   
Los Angeles adds $11,859,422 unexpended available revenue from previous year and $150,000 from 
other receipts to the revenue reported here (Appendix L). 
New York records their Franchise Fee revenues as an aggregate with “permits and privileges” 
(Appendix M). 
Phoenix’s expenditures exclude a $5,362,000 transfer to the general fund (Appendix O). 
The number listed for San Francisco’s Franchise Fee Revenue was reported in budget as “licenses and 
fines” (Appendix R). 
San Francisco lists one disbursement to the office in charge of regulating cable at $97,292,347 which 
does many things including architecture security, public safety, administration and finance, service 
delivery and finally public TV. This leaves us no way to discern the amount of cable related expenses 
(Appendix R).  
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Table 2 displays the revenue each city reported from the collection of PEG and 
Franchise Fees and the expenditures that were dedicated to the funding of the offices that 
facilitate the collection and disbursements of such funds, costs of PEG programming, 
and/or miscellaneous expenditures that were funded by either fee’s revenue. The 
remaining revenue after expenditures is the difference between the sum of revenue and 
sum of expenditures for a city. This revenue may be sent to the general fund or saved for 
the coming fiscal year’s cable costs.  
When PEG Fees are collected, the total revenue a city earned from that fee in 
particular is often not transparent. Despite evidence of a PEG Fee being collected in El 
Paso, Philadelphia, San Diego, and Seattle, PEG Fee revenue is unavailable in the budget 
details. These cities could have labeled the PEG Fee with a different name, or reported 
PEG revenue in the aggregate with other non-cable related franchises, licenses, and 
permits. New York City, for example, reported cable fees in the aggregate. Thus, in five 
of twelve cities collecting the PEG Fee the exact revenue generated by the fee is 
unknown. An unknown amount of total revenue in these cities conceals the information 
that would reveal whether or not PEG funds were spent in line with federal mandates.  
In Austin, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, and San Jose, spending on PEG related 
costs exceeds the total revenue collected on PEG Fees. Fort Worth and Houston show 
PEG expenditures that total less than their total amount of revenue in the year analyzed. 
Per federal law, cities are not required to spend all revenue in a given year (Cable Act 
§611(b)). Finally, Detroit reported a balanced PEG budget.  
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Franchise Fee revenue is reported in every city except Indianapolis2. When 
Franchise Fee revenue is reported, it is clear cities are receiving millions per year in 
revenue. However, the total revenue earned from this program remains ambiguous in 
several places. Jacksonville, New York City, and San Francisco report their total revenue 
earned from the Franchise Fee as an aggregate with other programs and fees. For 
example, Jacksonville reports their cable revenue as part of one large line-item that sums 
earnings from every municipal franchise in the city such as natural gas, sewer services, 
and telephone (Appendix K). It can however be determined that the financing of this 
revenue comes to bare heavily on the public. According to an Austin advertising agency 
there are 542,192 cable households in the city as of the last fiscal quarter of 2016 (Frink, 
2017). The total amount of Franchise Fee revenue from Austin divided by cable 
subscribing households reveals that each family paid the city approximately3 $69.50 in 
Franchise Fee charges alone. The same households paid $3.50 in PEG Fees. In total 
Austin cable subscribers $73 in 2016 in cable fees.  
It is difficult to determine where Franchise Fee revenue goes after it is collected. 
After the administrative, infrastructure, and PEG related costs of cable are funded, every 
city excluding Indianapolis, Jacksonville, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, yield excess 
revenue. It appears that some Franchise revenue is being allocated to PEG resources in 
Austin, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, and San Jose. Other funds are largely going to 
administrative costs, and occasionally going toward road and infrastructure updates due 
                                                          
2 This is likely due to the fact the budget analyzed for this city is a projected budget of FY 2016-17. 
3 It is likely there were slightly more or less cable subscribers during the last quarter of 2016 when the 
budget was completed.  
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to the physical wear and tear on the public right of ways. Most Franchise Fee funds are 
unaccounted for.  
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Table 3 
Expenditures per category from cable revenue  
City Administrative 
expenditures   
Infrastructure 







Austin  $2,496,739 $0 $2,977,438 $0 $5,474,177 
Charlotte $0 $0 $3,449,234 $0 $3,449,234 
Chicago  $0 $0 $656,297 $0 $656,297 
Columbus  $0 $0 $1,055,233 $0 $1,055,233 
Dallas $1,865,247 $701,988 $0 $0 $2,567,235 
Detroit  $1,489,998 $0 $500,000 $0 $1,989,998 
El Paso  $200 $0 $964,687 $0 $964,887 
Fort Worth  $0 $0 $300,000 $900,000 $1,200,000 
Houston  $2,347,250 $0 $2,570,307 $0 $4,917,557 
Indianapolis  $0 $0 $556,193 $0 $556,193 
Jacksonville  Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Not reported 
Los Angeles $11,223,166 $0 $20,015,751 $8,943,404 $34,959,299 
New York $36,241,332 $0 $0 $0 $36,241,332 
Philadelphia  Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Not reported  
Phoenix $2,368,000 $1,770,000 $2,292,349 $5,362,000 $6,430,349 
San Antonio  $0 $0 $212,410 $0 $212,410 
San Diego  $3,563,052 $0 $1,700,000 $0 $5,263,052 
San Francisco $97,292,347 $0 $0 $0 Not reported 
San Jose  $0 $0 $3,308,792 $0 $2,243,396 
Seattle  $4,566,090 $0 $3,851,739 $0 $8,417,829 
 
Table 3 categorizes the expenditures of each city to determine how revenue from 
cable fees is spent. Administrative expenditures include contracting fees, utility 
management, departmental services charged with the maintenance and operation of cable 
television, and transfers to the general fund. Infrastructure expenditures include the 
cutting and repair of streets and cables. PEG expenditures include costs of public, 
educational, and government programing such as video equipment, programming, 
broadcasting, and in the case of Sand Diego library improvement (Appendix Q). Other 
expenditures are detailed in Appendices A-R, and primarily include transfers to other 
administrative appropriations and offices that deal with cable in addition to many other 
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services such information security, municipal telecommunication networks, and 
technology and transportation infrastructure.  
In summary, cities can be divided into four groups. First, those that do not appear 
to collect a PEG Fee (8/20 cities). Of this group, no city reports PEG revenue. Second, 
those that do appear to collect a PEG Fee (12/20 cities). Of this group, five cities (El 
Paso, New York, Philadelphia, San Diego, and Seattle) do not report revenue. The seven 
that report revenue allocate funding largely to PEG programing and facilities, and the 
administrative expenditures accompanied by those projects. Cities are generally not 
financing PEG related infrastructure projects such as new facilities. The third group is 
composed of cities that collect a Franchise Fee (20/20 cities). Of this group nineteen 
cities report revenue. Across the board, cities are receiving large amounts of revenue 
from levying Franchise Fees.  The final group are cities that do not appear to report 
Franchise Fee revenue (1/20).  There is evidence to suggest this city collects the fee, but 
did not report it in the budget analyzed. This city (Indianapolis) funds public access 
television and PEG facilities via a PEG Fee. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION  
 Perhaps the most compelling reason the fees’ revenue should be administered to 
the public’s benefit is that all revenue from both fees originates from additional charges  
added to each subscriber’s cable bill. In other words, the totality of PEG and Franchise 
Fee revenue is funded solely by the millions of homes throughout the United States with 
a cable subscription. Thus, when comparing the potential value or benefits of these 
programs to their actualized value; actualized value should be considered on a scale of 
what benefits are realized for the these citizens and their communities.  
 This work has explored the potential value of both fees by analyzing the past, 
present, and predicated future contributions to the public. In the context of decaying local 
media, PEG and Franchise revenue function as an important tool, creating a fixture of 
locally operated media in many cities. The resources provided by the fees are a means to 
political efficacy, strengthened community ties, and multimedia resources in schools and 
other government institutions. The data affirms and complicates those theories. In some 
instances revenue from the fees is directed in plentiful amounts toward public goods. In 
other cases prospective millions of dollars are unaccounted for, calling into question the 
validity and effectiveness of PEG and Franchise Fees. 
 Franchise Fees. It is clear cities are collecting millions in Franchise Fee revenue. 
It can hardly be determined where Franchise Fee-revenue is allocated. However, the data 
does show it often funds the remaining costs of public programming and the capital costs 
of those facilities when the PEG Fee does not fully fund their operations, or exist in the 
city. In every city there are millions of remaining dollars that could be apportioned to 
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additional and diverse programming, media upgrades in schools and government offices, 
and facilities where the public may go and create their own broadcasts.  
 It cannot be determined how excess Franchise Fee revenue was used in any city 
outside of its allocation to the general fund. This is problematic because channeling a 
stream of revenue through the general fund prior to expenditures obscures the source of 
revenue being spent and makes the process less transparent. Without line-items for the 
differences between revenue from fees and expenditures it is not clear where this money 
is going. It could be unallocated funds are either sent to the general fund, saved for 
allocation toward cable costs for the coming year, or spent in unrelated areas. All of the 
above options are not the prime strategy for actualizing the full value of the fee for the 
public for three reasons. First, additional funds can nearly always be spent on public 
programming facilities and materials, media in education institutions, modernizing 
government telecommunication networks, and/or making more accessible broadcasts of 
government proceedings. Second, without making distinctions between different sources 
of revenue there can be no program evaluation. Citizens cannot determine how their 
money gets used and thus are denied the ability to engage in planning that optimizes the 
outcome of those funds because measurements of their use-value cannot be taken. 
Finally, a lack of clarity as to where franchise revenue is spent discourages community 
participation in the politics of resource allocation because the information is inaccessible. 
Community members often have the best insight on where local needs exist, and 
therefore excluding the private citizen from this process denies the optimal usage of the 
Franchise Fee. 
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 If cities are funding public television via their Franchise Fee, then it begs an 
additional question: why not also levy a PEG fee? Evidence that the cities above are 
funding public access television is proof positive that the reasoning for not levying the 
fee is not a lack of desire to fund local programming, but a lack of political will in that 
direction. This could also be due to the results of negotiations between cities and cable 
companies who would seek to avoid those fees for the sake of providing competitive 
pricing on their services. Additionally, the choice to fund public television from a 
Franchise Fee alone may allow cities to dodge accountability for two reasons. First, it is 
money sent directly to the general fund in most cases, making it untraceable. Second, 
there are no limitations on how it can be spent. This could allow a city to fund a single 
station at minimal levels while distributing remaining revenue to projects that are of 
lesser benefit to the public, or no benefit at all. In the opposite direction, one benefit of 
funding public television through the Franchise Fee alone is it lowers the tax on the 
public. Franchise Fees are capped, whereas levying a PEG Fee would require a fee for the 
cable customer greater than 5% of the bill.   
 In sum, portions of the Franchise Fee are being used in the interest of the public 
good. A large portion of cities allocate some funding from this fee to public access 
programing, but when comparing this to the millions of additional revenue eared across 
cities, it has the potential to do more. It remains unknown where excess funding is 
directed. Increased transparency would ensure resources are handled in a manner 
consistent with directly benefitting the local. For now, interested citizens cannot discern 
how Franchise Fee revenue (their money) is spent in its entirety.     
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 PEG Fees.  This project sought to determine whether or not cities are collecting 
PEG Fees, the amount of revenue those collections may consist of, and how that revenue 
was spent. The majority of cities researched are collecting PEG Fees at levels ranging 
from half a million to several million dollars. In cities where total PEG revenue is 
explicitly reported, expenditures appear to be consistent with FCC law. Of the cities 
collecting PEG Fees, many (7/12) are allocating their revenue toward PEG resources, 
cultivating local information networks that meet public needs. For example, Austin 
collected $1.9 million from PEG revenue, and spent a total of $2,977,438 on PEG related 
expenses. $1,102,438 was sent directly to the public access station, and $1,875,000 was 
spent on other PEG related capital costs such as facilities and equipment. As Austin spent 
an additional million on PEG related costs than their total PEG revenue it appears that the 
city spent PEG revenue within the confines of FCC regulation (Appendix A).  
 Of concern are the others, (5/12) that collect a PEG Fee, but do not report their 
revenue. In these cities, the PEG Fee is a tax on cable subscribers without accountability. 
It seems then, a demand for greater transparency among both fees is needed to address 
the disparity between the actual and theoretical value of these polices. 
 Finally, when analyzing the expenditures from each city, many line items receipts 
remain ambiguous. Often those disbursements listed as administrative costs are spent on 
allocations to an office that performs duties outside of cable and PEG programing making 
it uncertain how revenue is being spent (see Appendices A-T). For example, in San 
Francisco $97,292,347 is given to a Department of Technology responsible for the 
maintenance of the city’s telecommunication networks, architecture safety, and some 
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financing. A budget viewer cannot further parse out how funds were distributed within 
the department. Thus a member of the locale cannot ascertain the degree to which public 
television was funded compared to other expenditures, and whether or not it was funded 
within the confines of FCC regulation. Part of a renewed demand for transparency among 
PEG and Franchise revenue then, should also include a recommendation that 
expenditures be detailed rather than categorized. This is the difference between allocating 
funds to “cable costs” and instead distinguishing the cable costs as “PEG facility capital 
costs”, “road repair”, and “audio visual equipment.” Detail is a required component of 
transparency.  
Reccomendations 
 Several recommendations may help move cities toward a more transparent and 
effective use of the fees. First, the FCC should mandate that cities levy a PEG Fee if they 
levy a Franchise Fee. This would ensure the public is being repaid for their contributions 
to cable companies, the right of way has the necessary upkeep, and a portion of television 
remains public. Cities will not end the collection of Franchise Fees as it makes up 
significant portions of their budgets. Tethering the PEG Fee to any cable franchising 
agreement generates a lifeline for local media. Of course carriers would pass along the 
additional charges from the new contracts to the public. Because this effectively raises 
the price of a monthly cable bill carriers will be inclined to oppose a new agreement of 
this character. This will force cities to negotiate more narrowly with carriers or lower 
their Franchise Fee by the percentage of the PEG Fee to keep costs a constant. As it 
appears in the data most every city enjoys the discretionary revenue from Franchise Fees. 
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It is reasonable they will be hard pressed to forego this and instead will demand a PEG 
Fee on top of existing Franchise Fees or in place of some amount of the Franchise Fee.  
 Second, the FCC should mandate that revenue from Franchise and PEG Fees be 
reported individually in the city budget. This creates a central location where the public 
can observe how much was earned in a given year. Individual reporting would certify that 
cities do not report revenue with other income in the aggregate, masking just how much 
was made in a fiscal year.  
 Last, all expenditures from either revenue source must be line-itemed in the city 
budget. This would necessitate that each fee be housed in a different account separate 
from the general fund. Cities may still spend the Franchise Fee at their own discretion, 
but now with a publically accessible record. This would allow the public to determine if 
the funds are being used for the good of their localities. Public record of the spending can 
function as a means of political agency for community members. 
Other Considerations 
A prima facie tension is present in this research. While the literature review takes 
an avid position on the importance of the proximal, the small, and broadly the local- data 
for this project was extracted from the twenty of the largest metropolitan areas in the 
United States. This may seem to undermine claims being made about the importance of 
more narrow localities. To clarify, heterogeneous communities and localities compose the 
fabric of larger cities. PEG programming functions as insurance that the smaller non-
English-speaking-communities have access to public programming when ownership and 
programming diversity is on the decline. Hence while the criticism that more complete 
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research would also collect data from smaller locales is fair, small locales were 
considered from the onset.  
Future research should not only consider analyzing cities with a difference in size, 
but should consider performing a longitudinal observation. Authors like Waldman (2011) 
and Shaker (2014) have described the precarious position of local media, and while 
previous literature has illustrated several ways the fees may address this concern, its cross 
sectional data cannot make claims about trends. Additional work on this topic might use 
this data compared to another year or set of years to establish a relationship or lack 
thereof between the fees and the strength of local media, and how it fits within an 
evolving media environment. Longitudinal research could also offer the capacity to 
discover the predicated future of PEG programming years after Waldman (2011) foresaw 
a grim future.   
 One limitation to consider with the above data is a potential discrepancy in time. 
City and state policies can change quickly. There is a risk that cities that do not report fee 
revenue, but reported collecting either fee in a LexisNexis document could have revised 
their telecommunication policies between the dates of the evidence publication and time 
of this research. If this were the case however, then the LexisNexis search engine should 
have provided the legal documents indicating a change in policy.  
 Some may consider evolving communication infrastructure and markets to 
mitigate the importance of public programming. Such arguments may suggest that the 
internet and rise of digital television provide space for public creation and broadcast, and 
better resolve the concerns about the democratic empowerment of the local. While the 
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changing media landscape certainly includes some public benefits similar to PEG 
programs and facilities, it cannot act as a total replacement. Access to internet is not 
equal amongst all populations and is instead stratified along the lines of race and class 
(FCC, 2015). The rise of digital content instead suggests that PEG and Franchise Fees 
can be utilized to modernize communication infrastructure for those subject to the 
harshness of the digital divide. In some cases cities have subsidized internet using PEG 
fees (Waldman, 2011). The changing media landscape may illustrate the need to revisit 
the way cable contracts are created, and begin a conversation about the desirability of, 
and method by which, the FCC might integrate similar policies to Franchise and PEG 
fees into digital television services.  
 Finally, perhaps some concern can be given to the opportunity cost of focusing on 
PEG programming instead of conducting bureaucratic resources in other directions that 
are of more or equal importance. While this could be the case, PEG programming is a 
matter of community building. Equal access to local political information, user created 
content, and media made specifically for a given locale defines a public and motivates 
dialogue on the challenges facing it. Community building creates an engaged public 
which is critical to diagnosing and resolving other social ills because it provides the 
information and organization imperative to doing both. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 Franchise and PEG fees may provide a myriad of benefits. For some cities they 
are a wellspring that delivers local news and political information, for others the source 
of computers and broadband in public schools. The fees provide an outlet for the public, a 
space where they may broadcast their creations and opinions without consideration of 
private ownership. The commonality among the benefits of these programs is in the spirit 
of providing the means to create and consume media regardless of wealth or language. In 
contrast to this, 90% of American media organizations were controlled by six companies 
in 2011, compared to fifty companies owning the same amount in 1983 (Lutz, 2012). Of 
those six media giants 232 executives may determine the possible media choices of 277 
million Americans (Lutz, 2012).  
 As the means to create and distribute mass media become increasingly 
concentrated, academic and political focus should continue to review current media 
policy, making certain regulatory strategies are protecting the public and safeguarding 
democratic media from unfettered corporate competition. In the most material sense, 
when revenue from these fees are not reinvested in the public, the city is lessening access 
to avenues of speech, creativity, and political discourse for its citizens. Refusing to levy a 
fee gives cable companies a break and effectively loosens restrictions on ownership 
concentration. If local media is replaced overtime by the programs of media giants then 
many lose access to their publics, their proximal political spheres, and collectively the 
democratic citizen is left with a withered version of the fourth estate check on political 
corruption, especially at the local level (Baker, 2007). 
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 The local cable subscriber pays out-of-pocket each month for the benefits of local 
media, but the value of that programming has yet to be determined when compared to the 
amount each household pays their city annually. Additionally, there are massive 
quantities of left-over funds that could, and should, be directed toward local media and 
public projects. Situated in a time of cord-cutting, lack of clarity on the public benefits of 
the fees does not function well to preserve their existence as many consider going digital. 
The trends of internet-tv subscriptions, and decline in cable subscriptions suggests that 
Franchise and PEG Fee revenue will also decline as their source of funding is truncated. 
Thus there are many oncoming questions to be answered about how local television will 
be subsidized in the future. The internet may provide similar benefits to the 
establishments paid for by the fees, but it’s potential to completely replace the local 
information needs of communities remains doubtful (Shaker, 2014). If public 
programming is to be preserved and with it its contribution to localism, then greater 
oversight is needed to certify that those cities collecting fees from the public report their 
revenue, and that such revenue is re-invested in the public as it is primarily their money 








INVESTIGATING CABLE                                       41 
 
References  
Alliance for Community Media v. FCC. (1995)  56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir.). 
Baker, C. E. (2007). Media concentration and democracy: Why ownership matters. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Barthell, M. (2016). Five take-aways about the state of the news media in 2016. Pew 
Research. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/15/state-of-the-news-
media-2016-key-takeaways/.   
Boleman, T. (2008). Federal limitation of PEG Fees to capital costs only. Mackinac 
Center for Public Policy. https://www.mackinac.org/10130#_ftn*. 
Briffault, R. (1990). Our Localism: Part II--Localism and Legal Theory. Columbia Law 
Review, 90(2), 346-454. 
City and County of San Francisco (2009) ; The Digital Infrastructure and Video 
Competition Act of 2006. In Waldman, S. (2011). Information needs of 
communities: The changing media landscape in a broadband age. DIANE 
Publishing.  
de Tocqueville, A. (1899). Democracy in America: By Alexis de Tocqueville. PF Collier 
& son. 
Federal Communications Commission. (2017). Broadcast Station Totals. 
https://www.fcc.gov/media/broadcast-station-totals.  
Federal Communications Commission. (2015). 2015 Broadband Report. 
https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/reports/broadband-progress-reports/2015-
broadband-progress-report.  
INVESTIGATING CABLE                                       42 
 
Friedland, L. A., & McLeod, J. M. (1999). Community integration and mass media: A 
reconsideration. Mass media, social control, and social change: A macrosocial 
perspective, 197-226. 
Frink Advertising. (2017). Market overview Austin, TX. 
https://www.frinkadvertising.com/cable-television-advertising-market-overview-
austin/. 
Horriggan, J., & Duggan, M. (2015) One-in-seven Americans are cord-cutters. Pew 
Research Center. http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/12/21/4-one-in-seven-
americans-are-television-cord-cutters/ 
 Kaniss, P. (1997). Making local news. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Linder, L. R. (1999). Public access television: America's electronic soapbox. Greenwood 
Publishing Group. 
Lutz, A. (2012). These six corporations control 90% of the media. Business Insider. 
http://www.businessinsider.com/these-6-corporations-control-90-of-the-media-in-
america-2012-6.  
Mill, J. S. (1865). Considerations on representative government. Longmans, Green, and 
Company. 
Mondak, J. J. (1995). Nothing to read: Newspapers and elections in a social experiment. 
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Moy, P., McCluskey, M. R., McCoy, K., & Spratt, M. A. (2004). Political correlates of 
local news media use. Journal of Communication, 54(3), 532-546. 
INVESTIGATING CABLE                                       43 
 
Napoli, P. M. (2001). Foundations of communications policy: Principles and process in 
the regulation of electronic media. Hampton Pr. 
Pressman, A. (2016). More than one in five households has dumped cable goliath. 
Fortune. http://fortune.com/2016/04/05/household-cable-cord-cutters/. 
Rogoway, M. (2016). Lawsuit claims Portland, suburbs misspent $14 million in cable 
fees. The Oregonian.http://www.oregonlive.com/silicon-
forest/index.ssf/2016/11/lawsuit_claims_portland_suburb.html. 
Rogoway, M. (2017). Judge tosses out suit challenging Portland cable TV fees. The 
Oregonian. http://www.oregonlive.com/silicon-
forest/index.ssf/2017/07/post_4.html#incart_std.  
Schulhofer-Wohl, S., & Garrido, M. (2011). Do newspapers matter? Short-run and long-
run evidence from the closure of the Cincinnati Post. Retrieved from: 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/wp/wp686.pdf 
Shaker, L. (2014). Dead newspapers and citizens’ civic engagement. Political 
Communication, 31(1), 131-148. 
Shaker, L. (2009). Citizens' local political knowledge and the role of media access. 
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 86(4), 809-826. 
 Starr, P. (2011). Goodbye to the age of newspapers (hello to a new era of corruption): 
Why American politics and society are about to be changed for the worse. In R. 
W. McChesney & V. Pickard (Eds.), Will the last reporter please turn out the 
lights: The collapse of journalism and what can be done to fix it (pp. 18–37). New 
York, NY: New Press 
INVESTIGATING CABLE                                       44 
 
 Sixth Circuit Court, US. (2008). On Petition for Review of an Order of the Federal 
Communications Commission. No. 05-311. 
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0230p-06.pdf. 
 Tarde, G. (1903). The laws of imitation. New York, NY: H. Holt & Company. 
 Telecommunications, Title 47 U.S. Code § 542. Accessed from 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/542. Retrieved on 4/17/17.  
 U.S. House, 104th Congress, Committee of Conference. Telecommunications Act of 
1996 (H. Rept. 104-458, pt. 2). Text from Committee Reports. Available from 
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/104th-congress/house-
report/458/1; Accessed: 4/14/17.    
 Waldman, S. (2011). Information needs of communities: The changing media landscape 





INVESTIGATING CABLE                                       45 
 
Appendix A 
Austin 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance 
$37,700,000 Franchise Fees 
(VOL 2, p.255) 
$1,102,438 ATXN programs 






$1,900,000 PEG Fee Revenue 
(VOL 2, p.263) 
$475,000 Contracting fee from 





 $1,875,000 PEG related capital 
expenditures (VOL 2, p.263) 
 
2,021,739 to TARA (VOL 2, 
p.257) 
  
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 Austin City Budget 
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Appendix B 
Charlotte 2016-2017 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance 
$7,959,632 Franchise 
Fees (p.115) 
$3,449,234 Network and 
telecommunication 
operations (p.93) 
$8,059,632 Revenue   $4,510,398  
100,000 "Carrier 
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Appendix C 
Chicago 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance 
$29,200,000 Franchise 
Fees (p.23) 
$656,297 Cable and 
telecommunication public 
stations (p.115) 
$29,200,000 Revenue  $28,543,730 
 
  $ 6,56,297 Expenditures   
    
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 Chicago City Budget 
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Appendix D 
Columbus 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance 
$9,600,000 Franchise Fees 
(p.16) 
$1,055,233 Gov. television 
channel (p.215) 
$9,600,000 Revenue  $8,544,767 
 
  $1,055,233 Expenditures   
    
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 Columbus City Budget 
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Appendix E 
Dallas 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance 
27,394,587 Franchise Fees 
(p.561) 




$ 27,394,587 Revenue  $24,827,352 
 






 $701,988 Street cut right of 
way management (p.220) 
  
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 Dallas City Budget 
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Appendix F 
Detroit 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance 
$5,000,000 Franchise Fees 
(p.C-73) 
$1,489,998 Media services and 
communication (p.B-193) 
$8300000 Revenue  $6,310,002  
 (B-187) 
$ 2,800,000 Maintenance 
Fees from telecomm 
providers (p.B-187) 
500,000 costs PEG (p.B-194) $1,989,998 Expenditures   
$500,000 PEG revenue 
(p.B-197) 
   
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 Detroit City Budget 
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Appendix G 
El Paso 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance 
$8,767,956 Franchise Fees 
(p.88) 
$200 Cable franchise review 
services (p.102) 
 
$8,767,956 Revenue  $7,803,069 
 
 $125,968 PEG (p.261) 
 
$964,887 Expenditures   
 $838,719 PEG non 
departmental (p.261) 
  
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 El Paso City Budget 
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Appendix H 
Fort Worth 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance  
$6,680,684 Franchise Fees 
(p.F-12) 
$300,000 Cable Office Fund 
(p.E-100) 
 
$7,880,684 Revenue  $6,680,684 
 
$ 1,200,000 PEG Fees 
(p.H-317) 
900,000 Transfers and Others 
(p.H-318) 
$1,200,000 Expenditures   
    
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 Fort Worth City Budget 
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Appendix I 
Houston 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance  
$23,900,000 Franchise 
Fees (p.11-7) 
2,570,307 Maintenance and 
operations for PEG (p.x-88) 
 
$28,679,900 Revenue  $23,672,343 
 
$5,286,382 PEG Fees (p.x-
88) 
2,347,250 Contracts with 
nonprofit (p.x-88) 
$4,917,557 Expenditures   
    
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 Houston City Budget 
Of the $5,286,382 in PEG Revenue only $4,779,900 is new revenue in fy16 (p.x-88) 
368,825 of PEG funding was reserved for the next fiscal year 
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Appendix J 
Indianapolis 2016-2017 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance   
$556,193 PEG Fee Revenue 
(p.22) 
$343,275 Personal services  
(p.77) 
 
$556,193 Revenue  $0 
 
 $1,900 Material and services 
(p.77) 
 
$556,193 Expenditures   
 $179,289 Other services and 
charges (p.77) 
 
$30,000 Properties and 
equipment (p.77) 
 
$1,729 Properties and 
equipment (p.77) 
  
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 Indianapolis City Budget 
Franchise Fees are received at the state level and not reported in the city budget 
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Appendix K 
Jacksonville 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance  
$35,300,000 Reported as 
aggregate of all franchise 
fees including phone etc. 
(p.133-135) 
Unreported Revenue unreported   Unreported 
  Expenditures unreported    
    
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 Jacksonville City Budget  
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Appendix L 
Los Angeles 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance  








    




available revenue from 
previous year + 150,000 
from other receipts (p.269) 
Transfer to General Fund 
$5,223,022 (p.269) 
 
Cable franchise oversight  
$282,500 (p.269) 
 
Grants to Citywide Access 
Corporation $250,000 (p.269) 
 
LA Cityview public channel 
$559,943 (p.269) 
 
PEG access capital costs 
$694,000 (p.269) 
 
Reserve for PEG Costs 
$18,511,808 (p.269) 
 
Reimbursement of General 







All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 Los Angeles City Budget 
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Appendix M 
New York 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance  
$160,847,000 Franchise 
Fees listed with “Other 
Permits and Privileges” 
(p.21R) 
$36,241,332 Dept. of Info 
Tech and Telecomm (p.351-
E) 
$160,847,000 Revenue  $124,605,668 
 
  Expenditures unknown. 
$36,241,332 is an 
aggregate amount 
including services 
outside of cable costs.  
 
    
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 New York City Budget 
The Department of Information and Technology develops municipal use of cable TV in addition to other 
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Appendix N 
Philadelphia 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance 
$21,442,000 Franchise Fees 
(p.13) 
Unreported $21,442,000 Unreported  
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Appendix O 
Phoenix 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance  
$9,500,000 Franchise Fees 
(p.440) 













 $1,770,000 Street transportation 
(p.469) 
 






All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 Phoenix City Budget. 
The Communications Office funds Gov. Access Channels.  




INVESTIGATING CABLE                                       60 
 
Appendix P 
San Antonio 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance 
$30,700,000 Franchise 
Fees (p.115) 




$30,700,000 Revenue  $30,487,590  
 
 150,000 Alamo public 
telecommunications school 
readiness (p.358) 
$212,410 Expenditures   
    
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 San Antonio City Budget 
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Appendix Q 
San Diego 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance 









 $1,700,000 City TV PEG for 




    
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 San Diego City Budget 
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Appendix R 
San Francisco 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance  
3,090,700 Reported as licenses 
and fines (p.257) 






  Expenditures 
unknown. 
Department of 
Technology is an 
aggregate of 
many expenses 
outside of cable.   
 
    
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 San Francisco Budget 
Department of Technology does many things including architecture security, public safety, 
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Appendix S 
San Jose 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance  
$9,900,000 Franchise Fees 
(Attachment A, p.5) 







$2,000,000 PEG Revenue 
(p.VI-50) 
144,000 Access facilities (p.IX-7) 
 
461,396 Access facilities (p.IX-
20) 
 




    
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 San Jose City Budget 
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Appendix T 
Seattle 2015-2016 Cable Finances Detailed 
Revenues  Expenditures  Sums  Balance  
$8,645,104 Franchise Fees 
(p.447) 
190,000 Public library (p.143) $8,645,104 Revenue  $227,275 
 
 8,227,829 Information 
Technology Fund (p.447) 
$8,417,829 Expenditures   
    
All pages numbers listed from FY 2015-2016 Seattle Budget. 
3,661,739 of the disbursement to the information technology fund went to funding Seattle’s public 
access channel (p.447). 
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Appendix U 
Cable franchises per city 
City Major Cable Franchise(s)  
Austin  Comcast; Time Warner 
Charlotte Comcast; Time Warner  
Chicago  Comcast  
Columbus  Time Warner; AT&T 
Dallas  Time Warner; AT&T 
Detroit  Comcast; AT&T 
El Paso   Time Warner; AT&T 
Fort Worth  Time Warmer; Verizon 
Houston  Comcast; AT&T 
Indianapolis  Comcast; AT&T 
Jacksonville  Comcast; AT&T 
Los Angeles  Time Warner 
New York  Time Warner; AT&T 
Philadelphia  Comcast; AT&T 
Phoenix Comcast; Cox 
San Antonio  Time Warner  
San Diego  Time Warner 
San Francisco  Time Warner; AT&T 
San Jose  Comcast; AT&T 
Seattle  Comcast; AT&T 
 
